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Abstract This work deals with a Huﬀ-like Stackelberg problem where the
leader wants to locate a facility so that its proﬁt is maximal after the com-
petitor (the follower) has built its facility. We assume that the follower makes
a rational decision, maximizing its own proﬁt. The inelastic demand is aggre-
gated into the vertices of a graph, and facilities can be located along the edges.
For this computationally hard problem we give a Branch and Bound algorithm
using interval analysis and DC bounds. Our computational experience shows
that the problem can be solved on medium sized networks in reasonable time.
Keywords Stackelberg problem, bilevel optimization, Branch and Bound,
interval analysis, DC decomposition
1 Introduction
Stackelberg location problems are about making location decisions of two com-
peting ﬁrms that want to build new facilities. In the well-known Stackelberg
model the leader locates its facilities ﬁrst. Once the locations of the new fa-
cilities of the leader are set, the follower locates its new facilities. Each ﬁrm
has an objective function maximizing the market share or proﬁt of its facilities
which depends both on the locations and other features (qualities) of the new
and the existing facilities. The qualities of all existing and new facilities are
supposed to be known and ﬁxed. Since both ﬁrms try to maximize their mar-
ket share or proﬁt, the leader has to take into account the possible reactions
of the follower, leading to a bilevel optimization problem.
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In this bilevel problem the inner problem is similar to the Huﬀ-like sin-
gle facility location problem in [2]. Blanquero et al. deal with the problem of
locating a new facility maximizing the market share when probabilistic cus-
tomer choice is assumed. The problem is given by a network with the nodes
as demand points and facilities positioned along the edges. A B&B algorithm
is proposed with bounds using interval analysis and DC decomposition.
Sáiz et.al. [13] solved a Huﬀ-like Stackelberg problem on the plane, also
using a B&B method. The attraction (the measure of how attractive a facility
is for customers located at a particular demand point) and market share was
deﬁned in the same way as in [2] with Euclidean distance and the facilities
allowed to be anywhere in the convex hull of the demand points. Compared to
the same problem on a network, the planar space makes the problem inherently
more diﬃcult, although in this work the zero-sum property of the objectives
was of considerable help in the solution. Other examples of papers on Huﬀ-like
Stackelberg problems are the heuristic methods of Drezner and Drezner in [4],
and a bilevel approach in [8] by Küçükaydin at al. Heuristic approaches are
applied to the probabilistic (1|1)-centroid problem on the plane by Redondo
et al. in [10,9,11], where both the locations and the designs (qualities) of the
facilities are to be determined simultaneously. The objective function is the
net proﬁt taking into account the operational costs (depending both on the
location and the quality) of a new facility. They worked with a model similar
to ours but proposed only heuristic solutions. In [12], a two-stage method is
devised to solve a similar facility location and design problem, where competi-
tors react by changing the qualities of the existing facilities, but do not locate
a new facility for the follower.
In this paper, we aim at the solution of the Stackelberg problem on net-
works, maximizing the proﬁt of the leader. Literature on similar problems on
the plane discusses only heuristic solutions. In contrast, our objective is to
design a reliable method that gives a solution with prescribed accuracy. The
diﬃculty of the problem compared to those addressed in earlier works with
deterministic methods lies in the fact that the location space is a network and
costs appear in the objective function. The latter makes the problem signiﬁ-
cantly harder, since the objective function does not have the zero-sum property
as in [13]. Moreover, the objective function is not necessarily continuous. We
explore this property in Section 3.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formulate the model
of this bilevel Stackelberg problem. The structural properties of the problem
are examined in Section 3. In Section 4 we describe the Branch and Bound
method designed to solve the leader's problem, the bounds used in the solution
and the pseudocode of the algorithm. Computational results are shown and
analyzed in Section 5. Finally conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
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2 Model
Now we introduce the problem formally. Given a network N = 〈V,E〉, and for
each edge e ∈ E its length le. If we denote the endpoints of e by ai and aj ,
e = (ai, aj), then x ∈ [0, le] denotes the point on edge e at distance x from ai
and le − x from aj .
The ﬁxed demand is concentrated at the vertices of N , where each a ∈ V
has a buying power of ωa. The function da(x) gives the distance between the
demand point a and the facility at x. Assuming that x is located on edge e
with endpoints ai and aj , the distance is given as
da(x) = min{d(ai, a) + x, d(aj , a) + le − x},
where d(ai, a) is the length of the shortest path from demand point ai to a in
the network.
Introduce the following notations:
Indices
a index of demand points (a = 1, . . . , |V |)
j index of existing facilities (j = 1, . . . , k for the leader,
j = k + 1, . . . ,m for the follower)
l, f index of the leader and the follower
t, o index of the two ﬁrms when their role can be interchanged
Variables
xl position of the leader's new facility
xf position of the follower's new facility
Data
xj position of facility j
qj quality of facility j
ql quality of the leader's new facility
qf quality of the follower's new facility
ωa buying power of demand point a
Miscellaneous
da(x) distance between the demand point a and the facility
located at x
ϕ(·) a positive non-decreasing function
q/ϕ(da(x)) the attraction a feels for the facility at x with quality q
ψ(·) a positive non-decreasing function
We will assume that both ﬁrms are already present on the market, owning
a number of facilities. Let us introduce the following notations for the total
attraction of demand point a for the existing facilities owned by the leader,
the follower and both of them, respectively (we assume in this paper that the
attraction is additive),
βla =
k∑
j=1
qj/ϕ(da(xj)), β
f
a =
m∑
j=k+1
qj/ϕ(da(xj)), βa = β
l
a + β
f
a .
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By using the indices t for one of the ﬁrms and o for the other ﬁrm instead of
l and f , the above notation becomes βta and β
o
a.
The market share of ﬁrm t (with the new facility at xt and ﬁxed quality
qt) after the other ﬁrm locates at x̂o is
Mt(xt, x̂o) =
∑
a∈V
ωa
qt/ϕ(da(xt)) + β
t
a
qt/ϕ(da(xt)) + qo/ϕ(da(x̂o)) + βa
.
The function ϕ(·) is a positive nondecreasing function deﬁned on nonnega-
tive reals. The usual choice is ϕ(d) = dλ, λ > 0, where λ = 2 gives the so-called
gravitational model. We assume that ϕ(d) = dλ, thus the market share of ﬁrm
t at demand point a, denoted by ma(xt) can be written as
ma(xt) =
qt/d
λ
a(xt) + β
t
a
qt/dλa(xt) + qo/d
λ
a(x̂o) + βa
=
1 + βtad
λ
a(xt)/qt
1 + (qo/dλa(x̂o) + βa) d
λ
a(xt)/qt
, (1)
where the other ﬁrm's location is ﬁxed at x̂o. Denoting
γa =
qo/d
λ
a(x̂o) + βa
qt
and αa =
βta
γaqt
=
βta
qo/dλa(x̂o) + βa
,
the market share of ﬁrm t atdemand point a can be further simpliﬁed to
ma(xt) = αa + (1− αa) 1
1 + γadλa(xt)
,
where 0 ≤ αa ≤ 1 by deﬁnition. Thus, the total market share of ﬁrm t can be
written as
Mt(xt, x̂o) =
∑
a∈V
ωama(xt) =
∑
a∈V
ωa
(
αa + (1− αa) 1
1 + γadλa(xt)
)
. (2)
Both ﬁrms are assumed to have operational costs depending on their prox-
imity to the demand points and their quality. Costs near highly populated
areas are likely to be higher, also better quality generates higher costs. Such
behavior of the operational cost G(x, q) of a facility at x with quality q, can
be expressed as
G(x, q) =
∑
a∈V
ωa
q
ψ(da(x))
, (3)
where ψ(·) is a similar function to ϕ(·), though the two need not be the same.
To transform the market share into expected sales, a linear function is used,
where c is the income per unit of goods sold that could be diﬀerent for the two
ﬁrms. It is important to mention that other functions may be more suitable
for describing cost and income behaviour and have to be carefully adjusted
to a real situation, though their choice does not make much diﬀerence in the
methodology introduced in this article.
By the above assumptions the proﬁts of the two ﬁrms are
Fl(xl, xf ) = cMl(xl, xf )−G(xl, ql), Ff (xl, xf ) = cMf (xl, xf )−G(xf , qf ),
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without the costs of existing facilities which are supposed to be constant.
Using the previous functions we can formulate the Stackelberg problem as
max
xl∈[0,le],e∈E
Fl(xl, x
∗
f )
s.t. X∗f = argmax
xf∈[0,le],e∈E
Ff (xl, xf )
x∗f = argmax
x̂f∈X∗f
Mf (xl, x̂f ),
whereX∗f is the set of optimal locations of the follower maximizing its proﬁt for
a given xl. The follower's choice, in the case of multiple optima, is always the
one that maximizes its market share, thus minimizes that of the competitor.
Equivalently, it minimizes the competitor's proﬁt since the leader's operational
cost does not depend on the follower's location. This is called the pessimistic
approach in bilevel programming [3].
3 Discontinuity of the leader's objective function
The objective functions of both the leader's and the follower's problem are
nonlinear nonconvex functions. For the market shares of the ﬁrms we have
Ml(y, z)+Mf (y, z) =W ∀y, z, where W is the total demand, W =
∑
a∈V ωa.
This is called the zero-sum property.
According to the following assertion, the follower's problem as a function
of the leader's location
g(xl) = max
xf∈[0,lh]
Ff (xl, xf ), (4)
is continuous on an edge e, xl ∈ [0, le] (assuming the follower to be located on
edge h).
Assertion 1 Let D = [a, b] × [c, d] ⊂ R2 be a nonempty set. If f : D → R is
continuous, then g(x) = maxy∈[c,d] f(x, y) is continuous.
This is a special case of Theorem 4.3 in [3].
The objective function of the leader is usually not continuous if operational
costs are taken into account. However, the following result holds.
Assertion 2 The leader's objective function Fl is continuous if operational
costs are not taken into account, i.e. Ft(xt, xo) =Mt(xt, xo).
Proof By assumption, the leader's problem on edge e, when the follower is on
edge h, is
max
xl∈[0,le]
Ml(xl, x
∗
f )
s.t. x∗f = argmax
xf∈[0,lh]
Mf (xl, xf ),
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where multiple optima of the follower do not inﬂuence the objective of the
leader by the zero-sum property. Using the zero-sum property again, we can
reformulate Ml(xl, x
∗
f ) =W −Mf (xl, x∗f ), and so the problem is equivalent to
max
xl∈[0,le]
W −Mf (xl, x∗f )
s.t. x∗f = argmax
xf∈[0,lh]
Mf (xl, xf ),
which, in turn, using the notation introduced in (4) is
max
xl∈[0,le]
W − g(xl).
As we saw in Assertion 1, g(xl) is a continuous function, hence the objective
function of the leader's problem, W − g(xl), is also continuous. uunionsq
We construct a counterexample where the leader's proﬁt function is not
continuous when costs are present. Let x̂l be the location of the leader, where
there are more than one global optimizers for the follower's problem, i.e.
argmaxxf Ff (x̂l, xf ) = {x1∗f , x2∗f , . . . }.
Assume also thatG(x1∗f , qf ) 6= G(x2∗f , qf ). Thus,Mf (x̂l, x1∗f ) 6=Mf (x̂l, x2∗f ),
and by the zero-sum property the market share of the leader diﬀers on these
locations of the follower, i.e. Ml(x̂l, x
1∗
f ) 6=Ml(x̂l, x2∗f ). Given that the cost of
the leader depends only on its location,
Fl(x̂l, x
1∗
f ) = cMl(x̂l, x
1∗
f )−G(x̂l, q) 6= cMl(x̂l, x2∗f )−G(x̂l, q) = Fl(x̂l, x2∗f ),
i.e. the leader's proﬁt on the diﬀerent optimizers of the follower is not the
same.
The follower's choice between x1∗f and x
2∗
f is the location that maximizes
its market share. Assume that Ml(x̂l, x
1∗
f ) = Ml(x̂l, x
2∗
f ) +K, where K > 0,
hence x1∗f is the optimizer for the market share. Furthermore we can assume,
that there is a position x˜l inside the ε-neighborhood of x̂l, where the follower's
optimizer becomes x2∗f . We have Fl(x˜l, x
2∗
f )− Fl(x̂l, x1∗f ) ≤ K + δ(ε), but also
Fl(x˜l, x
2∗
f ) − Fl(x̂l, x1∗f ) ≥ K − δ(ε), because of the continuity of G. Since K
is independent of ε, Fl has a discontinuity somewhere between x̂l and x˜l.
A speciﬁc example is a network, shown on Figure 1, with three demand
points a1, a2, a3 and demand ωai = 1, i = 1, 2, 3. Length of the two edges
(a1, a2), (a2, a3) are 3 and 4, respectively, qualities are ql = qf = 1 and there
are no existing facilities. The gravitational model was used to calculate the
utility, that is, ϕ(d) = d2, and the income per units of goods sold was c = 1.
The function ψ used in the deﬁnition of the operational cost was set to ψ(d) =
d2 + 0.5.
The leader's proﬁt on edge (a2, a3) at x̂l = 3.0285 is 0.6307, and at x̂l+ =
3.0286 is 0.3872. The follower's choice is the point x1∗f ≈ 1.641 on edge (a2, a3)
and x2∗f ≈ 1.639 on edge (a1, a2), see Figure 1. The follower's market share
and proﬁt functions for the location of the leader x̂l and the leader's proﬁt
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a1
a2
a3
x̂l
x1∗f
x2∗f
Fig. 1: The network for the counterexample with the leader's placement
x̂l and follower's placements x
1∗
f , x
2∗
f , where Ff (x̂l, x
1∗
f ) = Ff (x̂l, x
2∗
f ) but
Mf (x̂l, x
1∗
f ) > Mf (x̂l, x
2∗
f ).
1 2 1 2 3 4
- 0.5
0.5
1.
1.5
Mf (x̂, xf )
Ff (x̂, xf )
x1∗ x2∗
a1 a2 a3
1 2 1 2 3 4
- 0.5
0.5
1.
Fl(xl, x
∗
f )
a1 a2 a3
Fig. 2: The market share and proﬁt functions of the follower for x̂l are shown
on the left and the proﬁt function of the leader with the optimal follower's
placement Fl(xl, x
∗
f ), on the right.
function are shown in Figure 2. From the graphs the discontinuity of Fl can
clearly be seen.
In the following section we propose an algorithm to solve both the follower's
and the leader's problem.
4 Solution method
A Branch and Bound method is designed to solve the leader's problem, and
consequently the follower's problem as well. The basic idea is that we simulta-
neously tighten the sets containing the global optimizer(s) of the leader's and
follower's problem, respectively.
Since the search space is a network, we deﬁne subproblems of the leader as
edges, or subsets of edges called segments or intervals, X = [x, x] ⊆ [0, le], e ∈
E. For a given edge (or segment) of the leader the follower's possible position
may lie on many edges of the graph, and until the leader is not enclosed tightly,
the follower can only be bounded to a set of edges or segments. Thus, for every
segment of the leader we store the segments of the follower that may contain
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its global optimizer. Consequently, a partial solution or subproblem of the
leader refers to a segment of the leader and the set of segments of the follower
associated with it.
An inner B&B method is used to tighten the segments of the follower, and
a main (outer) B&B method to tighten the segments of the leader. Therefore,
we have to compute lower and upper bounds for the leader's (follower's) proﬁt
when the follower (leader) is constrained to an interval. For the calculation
of the lower and upper bounds of a segment of the follower Xf , its single
leader's segment Xl is taken into account. These lower and upper bounds
are LB(Ff (Xl, x̂f )) and UB(Ff (Xl, Xf )), respectively, where x̂f is a feasible
solution in the follower's segment. For the calculation of the bounds for a
leader's segment Xl, every segment of the follower corresponding to it has to
be considered, i.e. LB(Fl(x̂l,Xf )) and UB(Fl(Xl,Xf )), where x̂l is a feasible
solution in the leader's segment and Xf 3 Xf the set of the corresponding
segments of the follower.
In all cases we considered two estimations of the bounds: interval arithmetic
and DC bounds combined with interval arithmetic.
4.1 Interval arithmetic bounds
Interval arithmetic is a means to obtain reliable results by putting bounds on
rounding and measurement errors in the ﬁrst place. We use it to obtain lower
and upper bounds on the objective functions automatically. See [5] for details
of interval analysis in global optimization.
Let us denote intervals with capital letters e.g. X = [x, x], where x ≤ x
are the lower and upper bounds of X, respectively. Using this notation, the
distance between an interval X and demand point a can be given as
dλa(X) =
[
dλa(X), d
λ
a(X)
]
, dλa(X) = min
{
dλa(x), d
λ
a(x)
}
,
dλa(X) =
(
max {da(x), da(x)}+ x− x− |da(x)− da(x)|
2
)λ
.
The upper bound of the distance is exact, and computed as the maximal
distance to the endpoints of the segment plus the maximal increase of the
distance in the segment. This latter is the half of the width of the segment
after the absolute diﬀerence |da(x)− da(x)| has been removed, see Figure 3.
When calculating interval arithmetic bounds for the proﬁt function, we
use form (2) of the market share. Having X̂o, a ﬁxed interval (or a point), the
upper bound of Ft calculated with interval arithmetic is
UBIA(Ft(Xt, X̂o)) = UBIA(cMt(Xt, X̂o))− LBIA(G(Xt, qt))
UBIA(Mt(Xt, X̂o)) =
∑
a∈V
ωa
(
αa + (1− αa) 1
1 + γadλa(Xt)
)
,
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0
da(x)
le
da(x)
da(x)
x x
|da(x)− da(x)|
x− x− |da(x)− da(x)|
Fig. 3: Upper bound of the distance, da(x)
where dλa(X) is given above, and the other constants are ﬁxed
γa =
qo/dλa(X̂o) + βa
qt
, γa =
qo/d
λ
a(X̂o) + βa
qt
, αa =
βta
γaqt
, αa =
βta
γaqt
.
The lower bound of the operational cost (3), assuming function ψ is of the
form ψ(t) = tµ + b, µ > 0, can be computed as
LBIA(G(X, q)) =
∑
a∈V
ωa
q
dµa(X) + b
.
Naturally, for the upper bound of the leader's proﬁt where all the correspond-
ing segments of the follower have to be taken into account can be obtained
as
UBIA(Fl(Xl,Xf )) = max
Xf∈Xf
UBIA(cMl(Xl, Xf ))− LBIA(G(Xl, ql)).
The interval arithmetic lower bound of the proﬁt can be obtained by chang-
ing upper bounds to lower bounds in the above formulae.
4.2 DC bounds
DC bounds can be computed for functions that can be written as a diﬀerence of
two convex functions. Every twice continuously diﬀerentiable function has this
property, however a good DC decomposition cannot be obtained automatically.
See Horst (1999) [6] for an overview on DC programming, and [1] for its recent
application in location analysis.
We will show that the market share Mt(xt, x̂o) for a ﬁxed x̂o is DC by
giving the DC decomposition of every function ma(xt) given in (1) assuming
λ ≥ 1. Consider ha(d) = 11+γadλ , for which ma(xt) = αa+ (1−αa)ha(da(xt)).
Function ha(d) is an S-shaped function, which means that it has exactly one
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inﬂection point, thus its DC decomposition is easy to obtain, see [2]. Namely
ha(d) = h
+
a (d)− h−a (d), where
h+a (d) =
{
ha(ca) + h
′
a(ca)(d− ca) if d ≤ ca
ha(d) if d > ca
,
h−a (d) =
{
ha(ca) + h
′
a(ca)(d− ca)− ha(d) if d ≤ ca
0 if d > ca
,
ca =
(
λ− 1
(1 + λ)γa
) 1
λ
.
where ca is the inﬂexion point of ha(d). Using the following proposition, we
can get a DC decomposition for ma(xt).
Assertion 3 (Blanquero et al. [2]) Let I ⊂ R be an interval. Let d : I → R be
a concave function on I, and let g : R→ R be DC, with a DC decomposition
given by g(x) = g+(x)−g−(x), with both g+ and g− non-increasing functions.
Then, the function f : I → R deﬁned as g(d(x)) is DC on I and a DC
decomposition is given by f(x) = f+(x)− f−(x) where f+(x) = g+(d(x)) and
f−(x) = g−(d(x)).
Therefore, the DC decomposition of ma(xt) is ma(xt) = m
+
a (xt) − m−a (xt),
where
m+a (xt) = αa + (1− αa)h+a (da(xt)),
m−a (xt) = (1− αa)h−a (da(xt)),
since da(·) is concave and 0 ≤ α < 1. Finally, the DC decomposition of the
market share is Mt(xt, x̂o) =M
+
t (xt, x̂o)−M−t (xt, x̂o), where
M+t (xt, x̂o) =
∑
a∈V
ωam
+
a (xt), M
−
t (xt, x̂o) =
∑
a∈V
ωam
−
a (xt).
To construct an upper bound on Mt we need the upper bound of M
+
t
and the lower bound of M−t . The upper bound of M
+
t is easily obtained. Let
xt ∈ Xt = [xt, xt], then the upper bound is
UBDC(M
+
t (Xt, x̂o)) = max{M+t (xt),M+t (xt)},
sinceM+t is a convex function. The lower bound ofM
−
t can be computed from
its linear underestimator, a tangent line at a point x˜t ∈ Xt
LBDC(M
−
t (Xt, x̂o)) = min{l(xt), l(xt)},
where l(x) = (M−t (x˜t, x̂o))
′(x − x˜t) +M−t (x˜t, x̂o). A DC upper bound of Mt
utilizing the results obtained above is given by
UBDC(Mt(Xt, x̂o)) = UBDC(M
+
t (Xt, x̂o))− LBDC(M−t (Xt, x̂o)).
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The DC decomposition ofMt(x̂t, Xo), where we calculate the market share
of a ﬁrm with its own location ﬁxed, can be easily obtained from the zero-sum
property, that is, Mt(x̂t, Xo) =W −Mo(Xo, x̂t).
The lower bound of the market share LBDC(Mt) can be computed simi-
larly. The DC decomposition of the cost function G(x, q) can also be obtained
from the decomposition of ha(d). Thus we have DC bounds for the proﬁt as
well.
4.3 DC bounds with interval arithmetic
When calculating the DC bounds the other ﬁrm's position can be given by an
interval Xo. In this case the market share of this ﬁrm xt is an interval valued
function, see Figure 4. We can take the lower or upper bounding function of
this interval valued function and calculate the DC bounds on these function.
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
Fig. 4: The market share as an interval valued function for Xo.
Essentially, we have to calculate DC bounds for the lower bounding func-
tion ∑
a∈V
ωa
(
αa + (1− αa) 1
1 + γadλa(xt)
)
,
where the DC decomposition and so the DC bounds of
1
1 + γadλa(xt)
.
can be calculated in the same way as we did in Subsection 4.2.
The following two subsections describe the inner and outer B&B methods
designed to solve the leader's problem, using the bound calculations we have
given above.
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4.4 Inner Branch and Bound: reﬁning the segments of the follower
We need to reﬁne both the leader's and their corresponding follower's segments
for the algorithm in order to achieve convergence. The inner B&B takes care
of the reﬁnement of the segments of the follower.
The stopping criterion of the inner B&B is to make the diameter of each
segment of the follower at least as small as the corresponding segment of the
leader. The output of the algorithm is the modiﬁed list of the segments of the
follower. The selection rule chooses the widest segment, while the branching
rule splits the given segment at its midpoint.
This method ensures for every segment of the leader, that its corresponding
follower's segments will have the same size as the leader's segment. Each time a
new leader segment is created, the inner B&B runs until its follower's segments
are reﬁned.
4.5 Outer Branch and Bound: solving the leader problem
The outer B&B reﬁnes the leader's segments and calls the inner B&B method
for each new segment of the leader. Recall that a subproblem of the leader is
an edge (or segment) with the corresponding set of segments for the follower.
Thus, the initial subproblems are the edges as segments of the leader, and for
each edge of the leader the set of edges as segments of the follower.
The output is the set of segments with objective value close to the global
optimum enclosing the global optimizer(s). The selection rule selects the par-
tial solution with the highest upper bound on the leader's proﬁt, while the
branching rule bisects the leader's segment at its midpoint and leaves the fol-
lower's segments unchanged but duplicated for the new leader's segments. The
algorithm terminates when either the (relative or absolute) gap of the objec-
tive of all leader's segments get smaller than a prescribed ε or their length
becomes smaller than a tolerance parameter δ. Formally, a leader's segment
Xl gets on the solution list if
UB(Fl(Xl,Xf ))− zL < ε or UB(Fl(Xl,Xf ))− z
L
UB(Fl(Xl,Xf ))
< ε or width(Xl) < δ
where Xf is the set of the segments of the follower for Xl and zL is the best
objective value for the leader found so far by the algorithm.
4.6 Algorithm
Algorithm 1 initializes the outer B&B's partitions using the input network. The
outer cycle deﬁnes the segments of the leader, while the inner cycle initializes
the segments of the follower for every leader's segment. An upper bound zUe
for edge e ∈ E and a global lower bound zL for the leader's problem are
calculated. For each edge of the leader e ∈ E and that of the follower h ∈ E
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we compute lower and upper bounds vLeh and v
U
eh for the follower's proﬁt. The
global lower bound for the follower's problem is vLe = min v
L
eh. The output is
the set of initial subproblems Λ.
Algorithm 1: Initialization of the outer B&B
Input : N = 〈V,E〉
1 Λ := {}, zL := 0
2 foreach e ∈ E do
3 Xe := [0, le], Y = {}
4 vLe := 0
5 foreach h ∈ E do
6 Yh := [0, lh]
7 Determine an upper bound vUeh of Ff over Yh
8 Compute lower bound vLeh of Ff at midpoint(Yh)
9 if vLeh > v
L
e then
10 vLe := v
L
eh
11 end
12 Associate Yh as a follower segment with Xe, Y = Y ∪ {Yh}
13 end
14 Determine an upper bound zUe of Fl over Xe
15 Compute lower bound zLe of Fl at midpoint(Xe)
16 if zLe > z
L then
17 zL := zLe
18 end
19 Λ := Λ ∪ (Xe,Y)
20 end
Output: Λ, zL
The pseudocodes of the inner and outer B&B algorithms are given in Al-
gorithm 2. For the sake of simplicity let us denote the objective function by
Ft (Fl for the outer and Ff for the inner B&B).
In line 1 we remove each segment from the partitions Λ known not to
contain any global optimizer. The main cycle of the general Branch and Bound
method is listed from line 2 to line 23. The main diﬀerence of the outer B&B
from the inner B&B is the call of the inner method added in lines 14 to 16.
In fact, the additional diﬀerences between the inner and outer procedure are
hidden in the bound calculations, as well as in the selection and termination
rules.
The output of Algorithm 2 is the set of segments which could not be
eliminated and thus contain the global optimizer and the point at which the
best lower bound was achieved.
5 Computational results
In this section we present the computational results of the algorithm described
in Section 4. The algorithm was written in C++ using the PROFIL/BIAS
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Algorithm 2: The inner and outer B&B method
Input : Λ, zL
1 Remove all Xi from Λ with z
U
i < z
L
2 while Λ 6= ∅ do
3 Select X from Λ
4 Bisect X into X1 and X2
5 for i := 1 to 2 do
6 Determine an upper bound zUi on Xi
7 if not zUi < z
L then
8 Compute a lower bound zi of Ft at midpoint(Xi)
9 if zi > z
L then
10 zL := zi, BestPoint := midpoint(Xi)
11 Remove all Xi from Λ with z
U
i < z
L
12 end
13 if not TerminationCriterion(Xi) then
14 if outer then
15 Call the inner B&B on the set of follower segments of Xi
16 end
17 Λ := Λ ∪ {Xi}
18 else
19 Γ := Γ ∪ {Xi}
20 end
21 end
22 end
23 end
Output: Γ,BestPoint
library [7], and executed on a cluster with 18 nodes. Each node has 16 cores
(Intel Xeon E5 2650) and 64 GB of shared memory. Throughout the execution
the memory requirement has never exceeded 4GB.
The relative and absolute accuracy used for the leader problem was ε =
10−3, while the tolerance for the length of segments was δ = 10−6. The at-
traction was chosen according to the gravitational model, i.e. ϕ(d) = d2, while
the function for the operational costs was ψ(d) = d2 + b with b = 0.5. The
income per unit of goods sold c, was chosen to be 1. The containers for the
partial solutions were augmented red-black trees (a general balanced binary
search tree) in all cases, sorted according to the selection rule.
The algorithm was tested on 8 networks from [2] where the number of nodes
ranges from 150 to 298 and the number of edges varies from 296 to 597. For a
given network several instances of the problem were generated using diﬀerent
numbers of existing facilities and diﬀerent distributions for the two ﬁrms. The
number of facilities tested were m ∈ {0, 8, 32} each with distributions k/m% ∈
{25%, 50%, 75%} denoting the percentage of facilities owned by the leader.
Obviously for zero existing facilities the distribution was omitted. For each pair
(m, k/m%) 5 problems were tested, with randomly generated demand at the
vertices (demand points) using uniform distribution in the interval [0, 10]. The
location of the facilities was generated by ﬁrst choosing an edge e randomly,
then placing the facility uniformly on the interval [0, le].
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The algorithm was ﬁrst tested on two networks RAT195G and PR152G
with many combinations of the diﬀerent bounds for the inner and outer meth-
ods. In Table 1 the mean execution times in seconds are shown for the diﬀerent
combinations. In the ﬁrst four lines the bounds used for a given column are
shown, where DC stands for DC bounds, and IA stands for Interval Arithmetic
bounds. We have highlighted the best result with a dark grey background, and
the second best by light grey.
Table 1: Computational time in seconds for diﬀerent combinations of upper
and lower bounds for the problems of the leader and follower.
Leader
LB DC IA DC DC IA IA DC
UB DC IA IA DC IA DC DC
Follower
LB IA DC DC DC IA IA IA
UB DC IA IA DC IA IA IA
Network
(nodes, edges)
m k/m% Mean execution times in seconds
PR152G
(152, 296)
0 565 361 406 472 433 441 487
8
25 985 458 497 770 607 605 659
50 749 349 380 546 466 465 508
75 827 276 303 732 330 336 368
32
25 899 365 401 727 467 460 505
50 982 389 426 856 453 478 524
75 819 263 290 736 299 310 342
RAT195G
(195, 336)
0 1902 1144 1214 1028 1870 1864 2001
8
25 2610 1374 1475 1376 2371 2298 2483
50 1272 722 773 748 1180 1147 1232
75 1259 713 760 771 1121 1106 1183
32
25 3710 1523 1626 2352 2438 2437 2645
50 3404 1255 1359 2205 1998 1992 2171
75 2506 959 1032 1542 1593 1589 1716
In all but one case the best computational time was reached by the com-
bination of bounds, where the lower bound of the follower is calculated with
DC decomposition, and all the other bounds with interval arithmetics. This
may be explained by the higher computational requirement of the DC bounds.
Surprisingly the diﬀerences between the conﬁgurations are rather small, and
their ranking is not clear except for the winner.
The algorithm with the best combination of bounds was tested on the
graphs with less than 300 nodes from [2]. The results are shown in Table
2, where the columns deﬁne the conﬁguration of the existing facilities, and
each row represents a network. For each network the number of nodes and
edges are given by their names. Notice, that the average computational time
for the diﬀerent networks does not really depend on their size, although it
is clear that the last graph UR532 is much harder to handle than the rest.
For all problems the program could terminate in less than 4 hours except in
a few cases, which are marked by * in the table since the average could not
be computed. The last line shows the average values for the diﬀerent graphs
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Table 2: Average computational time in seconds for each settings using the
best conﬁguration of the bounds.
m 0 8 32
k/m% 25 50 75 25 50 75
Network (Nodes, Edges) Mean execution time in seconds
KROA150G (150, 297) 583 686 499 523 569 724 405
KROB150G (150, 296) 427 586 521 436 861 735 524
PR152G (152, 296) 361 458 349 276 365 389 263
RAT195G (195, 336) 1144 1374 722 713 1523 1255 959
KROA200G (200, 392) 755 735 712 469 987 943 1080
KROB200G (200, 386) 592 1032 612 700 1670 1462 735
TS225G (225, 306) 785 594 510 504 1295 930 582
UR532 (298, 597) 4212 3697 2852 ∗ 3444 3236 ∗
Average* 664 781 561 517 1039 920 650
except the network UR532, where there were cases without results. It can
be seen that the problems where the leader owns more existing facilities are
generally easier, while more existing facilities overall make the problem more
diﬃcult to solve. In this sense, UR532 is an outlier, since it could not be solved
when the leader owns a high portion of the existing facilities. Also, among the
solved conﬁgurations the one with no existing facilities demanded the highest
average computational time for the 5 generated problems.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper a Huﬀ-like Stackelberg problem on networks was studied which,
unlike in other works in the literature, also considers operational costs for the
new facilities. Having thus made the model more realistic it has become much
harder to solve due to discontinuities that may emerge. The follower's problem
may have several global optimizers for a given leader, hence selection among
them is an issue to be taken care of. In a competitive setting the pessimistic
choice is rather realistic, i.e. the follower minimizes the leader's proﬁt. It is
known that the pessimistic approach makes bilevel problems much harder [3].
We proposed a deterministic method for the solution of this Stackelberg
problem. It is a Branch and Bound method designed to solve the leader's
problem using an embedded B&B to solve the follower's problem as well. For
bound calculations interval arithmetic and DC decomposition was used, as
well as a mixed interval DC bound in some cases.
The computational results clearly show that using the DC bound pays oﬀ
really well for computing the lower bound of the follower, while for the other
bounds it is still competitive. The results show that the problem can be solved
for medium sized networks in generally less than 20 minutes.
There is plenty of room for further research in this area. First of all, other
bounding procedures may speed up the algorithm, as well as paralellization
may bring the solution of larger-size problems within reach. An interesting
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extension of the problem is to consider the quality of the facilities as decision
variables. This calls for new bounding procedures.
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